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Abstract. Network operators are generally aware of common attack vectors that 
they defend against. For most networks the vast majority of traffic is legitimate. 
However new attack vectors are continually designed and attempted by bad 
actors which bypass detection and go unnoticed due to low volume. One 
strategy for finding such activity is to look for anomalous behavior. 
Investigating anomalous behavior requires significant time and resources. 
Collecting a large number of labeled examples for training supervised models is 
both prohibitively expensive and subject to obsoletion as new attacks surface. A 
purely unsupervised methodology is ideal; however, research has shown that 
even a very small number of labeled examples can significantly improve the 
quality of anomaly detection. A methodology that minimizes the number of 
required labels while maximizing the quality of detection is desirable. False 
positives in this context result in wasted effort or blockage of legitimate traffic 
and false negatives translate to undetected attacks. We propose a general active 
learning framework and experiment with different choices of learners and 
sampling strategies. 
Keywords: Network Security, Machine Learning, Active Learning. 
2 
1 Introduction 
Detecting anomalous activity is an active area of research in the security space. Tuor 
et al. use an online anomaly detection method based on deep learning to detect 
anomalies. This methodology is compared to traditional anomaly detection algorithms 
such as Isolation Forests (IF) and a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) based 
approach and found to be superior. However, no comparison is provided with semi-
supervised or active learning approaches which leverage a small amount of labeled 
data [7]. The authors later propose another unsupervised methodology leveraging 
Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) to ingest the log-level event data as opposed to 
aggregated data [8]. 
Pimentel et al. propose a generalized framework for unsupervised anomaly detection. 
They argue that purely unsupervised anomaly detection is undecidable without a prior 
on the distribution of anomalies and learned representations have simpler statistical 
structure which translate to better generalization. They propose an active learning 
approach with a logistic regression classifier as the learner [5]. Veeramachaneni et al. 
propose a human-in-the-loop machine learning system that provides both insights to 
the analyst as well as addressing large data processing concerns. This system uses 
unsupervised methods to surface anomalous data points for the analyst to label and a 
combination of supervised and unsupervised methods to predict the attacks [6]. In this 
work we also propose an analyst-in-the-loop active learning approach. However, our 
approach is not opinionated about the sampling strategy or the learner used in active 
learning. We will explore trade-offs in that design space. 
2 Dataset 
We have used the KDD Cup 1999 dataset which consists of about 500K records 
representing network connections in a military environment. Each record is either 
“normal” or one of 22 different types of intrusion such as smurf, IP sweep, and 
teardrop. Out of these 22 categories only 10 have at least 100 occurrences, the rest 
were removed. Each record has 41 features including duration, protocol, and bytes 
exchanged. Prevalence of attack types varies substantially with smurf being the most 
pervasive at about 50% of total records and Nmap at less than 0.01% of total records: 
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Table 1. Prevalence and number of attacks for each of the 10 attack types 
 
2.1 Input and output example 
The following table depicts 3 rows of data (excluding the label): 
 
Table 2. Snippet of input data 
 
 
The objective of the detection system is to label each row as either “normal” or 
“anomalous”. 
 
2.2 Processing pipeline 
We generated 10 separate datasets consisting of normal traffic and each of the attack 
vectors. This way we can study the proposed approach over 10 different attack 
vectors with varying prevalence and ease of detection. Each dataset is then split into 
train, development, and test partitions with 80%, 10%, and 10% proportions. All 
algorithms are trained on the train set and evaluated on the development set. The 
winning strategy is tested on the test set to generate an unbiased estimate of 
generalization. Categorical features are one-hot encoded and missing values are filled 
with zero. 
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3 Approach 
3.1 Evaluation metric 
Since labeled data is very hard to come by in this space, we have decided to treat this 
problem as an active learning one. Therefore, the machine learning model receives a 
subset of the labeled data. We will use the F1 score to capture the trade-off between 
precision and recall: 
𝐹1 =
2 × 𝑃 × 𝑅
𝑃 + 𝑅
 
where 𝑃 = 𝑇𝑃 (𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃)⁄ , 𝑅 = 𝑇𝑃 (𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)⁄ , 𝑇𝑃 is true positives, 𝐹𝑃 is false 
positives, and 𝐹𝑁 is the number of false negatives. 
 
A model that is highly precise (does not produce false positives) is desirable as it won’t 
waste the analyst’s time. However, this usually comes at the cost of being overly 
conservative and not catching anomalous activity that is indeed an intrusion. 
 
3.2 Oracle and baseline 
Labeling effort is a major factor in this analysis and a dimension along which we’ll 
define the upper and lower bounds of the quality of our detection systems. A purely 
unsupervised approach would be ideal as there’s no labeling involved. We’ll use an 
Isolation Forest [1] to establish our baseline. Isolation Forests (IF) are widely, and 
very successfully, used for anomaly detection. An IF consists of a number of Isolation 
Trees, each of which are constructed by selecting random features to split and then 
selecting a random value to split on (random value in the range of continuous 
variables or random value for categorical variables). Only a small random subset of 
the data is used for growing the trees and usually a maximum allowable depth is 
enforced to curb computational cost. We have used 10 trees for each IF. Intuitively, 
anomalous data points are easier to isolate with a smaller average number of splits 
and therefore tend to be closer to the root. The average closeness to the root is 
proportional to the anomaly score (i.e. the lower this score the more anomalous the 
data point). 
 
A completely supervised approach would incur maximum cost as we’ll have to label 
every data point. We have used a random forest classifier with 10 estimators trained 
on the entire training dataset to establish the upper bound (i.e. oracle). The following 
F1 scores are reported for evaluation on the development set: 
Table 3. Oracle and baseline for different attack types. 
Label Baseline F1 Oracle F1 
smurf 0.38 1.00 
neptune 0.49 1.00 
back 0.09 1.00 
satan 0.91 1.00 
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ipsweep 0.07 1.00 
portsweep 0.53 1.00 
warezclient 0.01 1.00 
teardrop 0.30 1.00 
pod 0.00 1.00 
nmap 0.51 1.00 
Mean ± standard deviation 0.33 ± 0.29 1.00 ± 0.01 
 
3.3 Active learning 
The proposed approach starts with training a classifier on a small random subset of 
the data (i.e. 1,000 samples) and then continually queries a security analyst for the 
next record to label. There’s a maximum budget of 100 queries. 
 
Fig. 1. Active learning scheme. 
This approach is highly flexible. The choice of classifier can range from logistic 
regression all the way up to deep networks as well as any ensemble of those models. 
Moreover, the hyper-parameters for the classifier can be tuned on every round of 
training to improve the quality of predictions. The sampling strategy can range from 
simply picking random records to using classifier uncertainty or other elaborate 
schemes. Once a record is labeled it’s removed from the pool of labeled data and placed 
into the labeled records database. We’re assuming that labels are trustworthy which 
may not necessarily be true. In other words, the analyst might make a mistake in 
labeling or there may be low consensus among analysts around labeling. In the presence 
of those issues we’d need to extend this approach to query multiple analysts and to 
build the consensus of labels into the framework. 
4 Experiments 
4.1 Learners and sampling strategies 
We used a Logistic Regression (LR) classifier with L2 penalty as well as a Random 
Forest (RF) classifier with 10 estimators, Gini impurity for splitting criteria, and 
unlimited depth for our choice of learners. We also chose three sampling strategies. 
First is a random strategy that randomly selects a data point from the unlabeled pool. 
The second option is uncertainty sampling that scores the entire database of unlabeled 
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data and then selects the data point with the highest uncertainty. The first option is 
entropy sampling, which calculates the entropy over the positive and negative classes 
and selects the highest entropy data point. Ties are broken randomly for both 
uncertainty and entropy sampling. 
 
The following tabulates the F1 score immediately after the initial training (F1 initial) 
followed by the F1 score after 10, 50, and 100 queries to the analyst across different 
learners and sampling strategies aggregated over the 10 attack types: 
Table 4. Effects of learner and sampling strategy on detection quality and latency. 
 
 
Random forests are strictly superior to logistic regression from a detection perspective 
regardless of the sampling strategy. It is also clear that uncertainty and entropy 
sampling are superior to random sampling which suggests that judiciously sampling the 
unlabeled dataset can have a significant impact on the detection quality, especially in 
the earlier queries (F1 goes from 0.90 to 0.98 with just 10 queries). It is important to 
notice that the query time might become a bottleneck. In our examples the unlabeled 
pool of data is not very large but as this set grows these sampling strategies have to 
scale accordingly. The good news is that scoring is embarrassingly parallelizable. 
 
The following figure depicts the evolution of detection quality as the system makes 
queries to the analyst for an attack with high prevalence (i.e. the majority of traffic is 
an attack): 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig 2. Detection quality for a high prevalence attack. 
 
The random forest learner combined with an entropy sampler can get to perfect 
detection within 5 queries which suggests high data efficiency [2]. We will compare 
this to the Nmap attack with significantly lower prevalence (i.e. less than 0.01% of the 
dataset is an attack): 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig 3. Detection quality for a low prevalence attack. 
 
We know from our oracle evaluations that a random forest model can achieve perfect 
detection for this attack type, however we see that an entropy sampler is not guaranteed 
to query the optimal sequence of data points. The fact that the prevalence of attacks is 
very low means that the initial training dataset probably doesn’t have a representative 
set of positive labels that can be exploited by the model to generalize. 
 
The failure of uncertainty sampling has been documented [3] and more elaborate 
schemes can be designed to exploit other information about the unlabeled dataset that 
the sampling strategy is ignoring. To gain some intuition into these deficiencies we’ll 
unpack a step of entropy sampling for the Nmap attack. Figure 4 compares (a) the 
relative feature importance after the initial training to (b) the oracle: 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig 4. Random forest feature importance for (a) initial training and (b) oracle. 
 
The oracle graph suggests the “src_bytes” is a feature that the model is highly reliant 
upon for prediction. However, our initial training is not reflecting this. We’ll compute 
the z-score for each of the positive labels in our development set: 
𝑧𝑓𝑖 =
|𝜇𝑅𝑓𝑖
− 𝜇𝑊𝑓𝑖
|
𝜎𝑅𝑓𝑖
 
where 𝜇𝑅𝑓𝑖
 is the average value of the true positives for feature 𝑖 (i.e. 𝑓𝑖), 𝜇𝑊𝑓𝑖
 is the 
average value of the false positives or false negatives, and 𝜎𝑅𝑓𝑖
 is the standard deviation 
of the values in the case of true positives. 
 
The higher this value is for a feature the more our learner need to know about it to 
correct the discrepancy. However, we see that the next query made by the strategy does 
not involve a decision around this fact. The score for “src_bytes” is an order of 
magnitude larger than other features. The model continues to make uncertainty queries 
staying oblivious to information about specific features that it needs to correct for. 
 
4.2 Ensemble learning 
Creating an ensemble of classifiers is usually a very effective way to combine the power 
of multiple learners [4]. This strategy is highly effective when the errors made by 
classifiers in the ensemble tend to cancel out and are not compounded. To explore this 
idea, we designed a weighted ensemble: 
 
Fig 5. Ensemble learner. 
 
The prediction in the above diagram is calculated as follows: 
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𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒 = 𝕀[∑ 𝑤𝑒
𝑒𝜖E
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐸 > ∑ 𝑤𝑒 2⁄
𝑒𝜖E
] 
where 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐸  𝜖 {0,1} is the binary prediction associated with the classifier 
𝑒 𝜖 𝐸 = {𝑅𝐹, 𝐺𝐵, 𝐿𝑅, 𝐼𝐹} and 𝑤𝑒 is the weight of the classifier in the ensemble. 
 
The weights are proportional to the level of confidence we have in each of the learners. 
We’ve added a gradient boosting classifier with 10 estimators. 
 
Unfortunately, the results of this experiment suggest that this particular ensemble is not 
adding any additional value. Figure 6 shows that at best the results match that of random 
forest (a) and in the worst case they can be significantly worse (b): 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig 6. Ensemble active learning results for warezclient and satan attacks. 
 
The majority of the error associated with this ensemble approach relative to only using 
random forests can be attributed to a high false negative rate. The other four algorithms 
are in most cases conspiring to generate a negative class prediction which overrides the 
positive prediction of the random forest. 
 
4.3 Sampling the outliers generated using unsupervised learning 
Finally, we explore whether we can use an unsupervised method for finding the most 
anomalous data points to query. If this methodology is successful, the sampling strategy 
is decoupled from active learning and we can simply precompute and cache the most 
anomalous data points for the analyst to label. 
 
We compared a sampling strategy based on isolation forest with entropy sampling: 
Table 5. Active learning with an unsupervised sampling strategy. 
Sampling strategy Initial F1 F1 after 10 F1 after 50 F1 after 100 
Isolation Forest 
0.94 ± 0.07 
0.94±0.05 0.95±0.09 0.93±0.09 
Entropy 0.98±0.03 0.99±0.03 0.99±0.03 
 
In both cases we’re using a random forest learner. The results suggest that entropy 
sampling is superior since it’s sampling the most uncertain data points in the context 
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of the current learner and not a global notion of anomaly which isolation forest 
provides. 
5 Conclusion 
We have proposed a general active learning framework for network intrusion 
detection. We experimented with different learners and observed that more complex 
learners can achieve higher detection quality with significantly less labeling effort for 
most attack types. We did not explore other complex models such as deep neural 
networks and did not attempt to tune the hyper-parameters of our model. Since the 
bottleneck associated with this task is the labeling effort, we can add model tuning 
while staying within the acceptable latency requirements. 
 
We then explored a few sampling strategies and discovered that uncertainty and 
entropy sampling can have a significant benefit over unsupervised or random 
sampling. However, we also realized that these strategies are not optimal, and we can 
extend them to incorporate available information about the distribution of the features 
for mispredicted data points. We attempted a semi-supervised approach called Label 
Spreading that builds the affinity matrix over the normalized graph Laplacian which 
can be used to create pseudo-labels for unlabeled data points [9]. However, this 
methodology is very memory-intensive, and we couldn’t successfully train and 
evaluate it on all of the attack types. 
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